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2  
THE IRRELEVANCE TO SENTENCING OF (MOST) 
INCIDENTAL HARDSHIPS SUFFERED BY OFFENDERS 
 
 
MIRKO BAGARIC,* LIDIA XYNAS** AND VICTORIA LAMBROPOULOS*** 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Criminal offenders often experience hardships beyond the imposition of a 
court-imposed sanction. These hardships typically take a variety of forms,  
but can be grouped into a number of relatively well-established categories, 
including loss of employment, public opprobrium and injuries sustained during 
or around the time of the commission of the crime. Other examples are 
deportation from Australia and the imposition of traditional forms of 
punishment.1 Collectively, these harms are termed incidental hardships or extra-
curial punishment.2 Formally, extra-curial punishment is defined as a ‘loss or 
detriment imposed on an offender by persons other than the sentencing court, for 
the purpose of punishing the offender for his [or her] offence or at least by reason 
of the offender having committed the offence’.3 
Despite the fact that it is not uncommon for offenders to experience one or 
more of these forms of deprivations, the law in this area is unsettled. There is no 
consistent or orthodox approach to the relevance of incidental hardships to the 
sentencing calculus. The uncertainty in this area is exacerbated by the fact that 
this is an under-researched area of law and the courts have not sought to develop 
an overarching theory regarding the impact that extra-curial hardships should 
have in the sentencing realm. To the (limited) extent that the issue has been 
subject to academic analysis, no firm answers have been posited. This, at least to 
some extent, stems from the complexities of the issue and the vagaries of 
sentencing law in general. 
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1  The impact that punishment may have on an offender’s dependants is not normally categorised as an 
incidental form of punishment. For a consideration of this issue, see Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, 
‘First-Time Offender, Productive Offender, Offender with Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders 
(Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing’ (2015) 78 Albany Law Review 397. 
2  The terms are used interchangeably in this article. 
3  Silvano v The Queen (2008) 184 A Crim R 593, 598 [29] (James J). See also Mark David Chong, Jamie 
Fellows and Frank Richards, ‘Sentencing the “Victimised Criminal”: Delineating the Uncertain Scope of 
Mitigatory Extra-curial Punishment’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 379, 381–2. 
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The relevance of extra-curial punishments has been considered by Chong, 
Fellows and Richards recently.4 The authors use as their guiding determinant in 
this article the notion of ‘common sense’. The authors conclude that 
[t]he rules regarding extra-curial punishment and the manner in which they are 
applied comprise an area that deserves greater study because of the continuing 
complexity and ambiguity surrounding both the definitional parameters of extra-
judicial sanctions, and the way in which the courts have applied these rules in a 
flexible, and sometimes improvised, fashion.5 
The authors do not make clear or wide-ranging reform proposals. Moreover, 
in our view, notions of common sense cannot provide clarity to this issue. In 
order for a rule-based system to operate as law, minimal operative standards must 
be declared in advance with sufficient meaning and precision to guide conduct 
and lead to predictable results. These rules need to be developed against the 
backdrop of overarching objective principles and policies.6 In this article, we 
attempt to provide concrete answers to the proper role of extra-curial hardships in 
sentencing, by examining the issue from the perspective of overarching 
sentencing objectives and principles, coupled with an empirical understanding of 
the efficacy of sentencing to achieve its relevant objectives. 
Sentencing is the system through which offenders are formally punished for 
their transgressions.7 To facilitate this process, courts are empowered to impose a 
range of sanctions, including fines and imprisonment,8 and are required to impose 
hardships which are commensurate with the gravity of the offence and culpability 
of the offender.9 There are, ostensibly, sound reasons for excluding incidental 
hardships from the sentencing calculus. Incidental hardships occur outside this 
process, their impact on the offender is often difficult to ascertain and, arguably, 
they not should undermine or detract from the imperative to impose a criminal 
sanction, which is proportionate to the level of wrongdoing. Further, enabling 
prominent and financially successful people (who are most likely to be the 
subject of public condemnation and the loss of employment as a result of 
criminal offending) to avoid the full burden of the criminal law because of 
incidental disadvantages they experience, potentially operates to entrench 
existing positions of power and privilege.10 
There is considerable intuitive appeal associated with conferring the same 
criminal sanction on a person who assaults his or her partner or steals from his or 
her friends, irrespective of whether he or she is a lawyer, politician or bricklayer. 
In the same vein, it is not clear that a bank robber who breaks his or her leg as a 
result of stepping into a ditch while fleeing the scene of the crime should receive 
                                                 
4  The relevance of extra-curial punishments is considered by Chong, Fellows and Richards, above n 3. 
5  Ibid 405. 
6  See also the judgment of Kirby J in Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 186. 
7  Although, as is discussed below, rehabilitation is also an objective of punishment. 
8  For an overview of the range of criminal sanctions, see Arie Freiberg, Fox & Freiberg’s Sentencing: 
State and Federal Law in Victoria (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2014) chs 7–12; Geraldine Mackenzie and Nigel 
Stobbs, Principles of Sentencing (Federation Press, 2010) chs 6, 7. 
9  See also below Part III. 
10  See also below Part II. 
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a lighter penalty than the identically-placed robber who breaks his or her leg 
while playing football several hours after the robbery. These reasons, 
individually or collectively, have not always been endorsed by the courts and it 
has often been held that incidental punishments mitigate penalty.11 Despite this, 
the courts have not extensively canvassed the rationale for reducing sentences on 
the basis of incidental hardships. To the extent that such analysis has occurred, 
judges have referred to the supposed reduced need for specific deterrence and 
retribution.12 
In the next part of this article, we examine the existing law relating to the 
relevance of incidental hardships to sentencing. Part III sets out an overarching 
framework for dealing with incidental hardships in the sentencing system. In Part 
IV, we apply the framework in relation to each category of extra-judicial 
punishment. Our recommendations are summarised in the concluding remarks. 
By way of overview, it is suggested that while there are a number of different 
forms of deprivations that come within the description of extra-judicial 
punishment, there is no common approach that should be adopted regarding 
incorporating them into the sentencing realm. Public opprobrium should be 
ignored as a sentencing consideration. Nearly all criminal guilt attracts some 
censure and condemnation; hence, to some extent, all sentenced offenders are 
subject to a degree of opprobrium. 13  Condemnation is an intrinsic aspect of 
criminal guilt and it is not tenable to measure with any accuracy the level of 
opprobrium to which an individual is subjected. Further, the manner in which 
public scorn affects an offender is to a large degree within his or her control. 
Opprobrium, unlike a fine or incarceration, is intangible. Its impact can be 
diminished and, in fact negated by a resilient offender. The fact that high-profile 
offenders and those convicted of certain offences are subjected to more 
opprobrium is a matter of degree; it does not change the nature of the hardship. 
Injuries suffered during the commission of a crime should also be ignored by 
a sentencing court. It is acknowledged that some offenders sustain serious and 
permanent injuries during the commission of a crime, for example, if they are 
shot by police. However, there is generally no relevant difference between  
an offender who is injured while committing a crime and an offender who 
sustains the same injuries at his or her workplace the day after the offence.  
It is conceded that, in some cases, an injury may make a criminal penalty, 
especially imprisonment, more burdensome. However, particularly burdensome 
prison conditions are already a discrete mitigating factor,14 and, to allow injuries 
sustained during the commission of a crime to discount penalty, would enable 
offenders to unduly double-dip on this account. For similar reasons, the infliction 
                                                 
11  See below Part II. 
12  See below Part III. 
13  See below Part IV. 
14  See Mirko Bagaric, Richard Edney and Theo Alexander, ‘(Particularly) Burdensome Prison Time Should 
Reduce Imprisonment Length – And Not Merely in Theory’ (2014) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 
409. 
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of traditional forms of punishment on an offender should also not mitigate 
penalty. 
A stronger case can be made for accommodating employment deprivations 
within the sentencing calculus. The loss of employment is a tangible hardship 
and, as far as possible, sanctions should have an equal impact on offenders. A 
lawyer who loses his or her livelihood as the result of a conviction for theft is 
disadvantaged more considerably than a bricklayer who receives the same court 
sanction but retains his or her job. Employment deprivations experienced by 
offenders arise as a result of systemic and deliberate actions by other individuals, 
entities or institutions and are directly related to the offending. This sets them 
apart from extra-curial hardships in the form of physical harm to offenders, 
which normally are (albeit unfortunate) happenstances associated with the 
offending. As will be discussed further below, deportation which arises due to the 
commission of a crime should be a mitigating consideration because it, also, 
arises from a systematic and calculated response to the offending. 
Implementation of these recommendations would provide doctrinal and 
jurisprudential clarity in this area of law, thereby making sentencing outcomes 
more predictable and justifiable. 
 
II   CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
In this part of the article, we examine the existing legal position regarding the 
relevance of extra-curial hardships to sentencing, and, in particular, whether such 
considerations operate to mitigate penalty. Prior to considering that matter in 
detail, however, we provide a brief overview of the sentencing system. 
Each Australian jurisdiction has its own sentencing law and process, which is 
prescribed by a combination of legislation15 and common law.16 While there is 
divergence in terms of the finer details of each of the sentencing systems, the 
broad approach is similar. The key sentencing objectives are community 
protection, (specific and general) deterrence and rehabilitation and retribution.17 
The principle of proportionality is also a cardinal consideration in determining 
the nature of a sanction and its length or severity.18 
Sentencing in Australia is largely a discretionary process, whereby judges 
have considerable discretion to impose a penalty, so long as it does not exceed 
the maximum penalty for the offence. This methodology is termed ‘instinctive 
                                                 
15  The main legislative schemes are the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IB; Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT); 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT); Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA); Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas); Sentencing Act 1991 
(Vic); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). 
16  For a deeper analysis of sentencing law in Australia, see Freiberg, above n 8, ch 1; Mackenzie and 
Stobbs, above n 8, ch 1. 
17  See Freiberg, above n 8, ch 3; Mackenzie and Stobbs, above n 8, ch 3. 
18  See Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467 (Stephen J); Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 
465, 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ); see also the discussion in Part III below. 
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synthesis’.19 In accordance with this approach, judges are required to identify all 
of the factors that are relevant to a particular sentence, and arrive at a judgment 
regarding the precise penalty that is appropriate in all of the circumstances.20 
However, judges are not required, nor permitted, to set out with particularity the 
precise weight that has been conferred on any particular sentencing factor.21 
A large number of aggravating and mitigating considerations have been 
developed; most are derived from the common law. One study identified nearly 
300 such considerations.22 While some legislative schemes expressly set out a 
number of factors that can mitigate sentence, none of them expressly refer to 
extra-curial hardship. Thus, the evolution and status of incidental hardships in the 
sentencing realm has evolved as part of the common law.23 
We now examine the role of incidental hardships in the sentencing calculus. 
The analysis commences by considering what is often the most serious form of 
incidental hardship – personal injuries. 
 
A   Incidental Injuries or Harm Stemming from Offending 
A number of cases have considered the issue of whether injuries sustained by 
an offender during or shortly after the offence should mitigate penalty. However, 
few judges have expressly indicated a rationale which could justify reducing the 
severity of a sanction for this reason. One exception is the case of R v 
Hannigan,24 where Chesterman JA stated that injuries received by an offender 
could mitigate penalty because the need for deterrence and retribution is 
lessened. The following comments by His Honour provide a useful backdrop to 
the following discussion: 
the theory which underlies the relevance of extra-curial punishment to sentence is 
that it deters an offender from re-offending by providing a reminder of the 
unhappy consequence of criminal misconduct, or it leaves the offender with a 
disability, some affliction, which is a consequence of criminal activity. In such 
cases one can see that a purpose of sentencing by the court, deterrence or 
retribution, has been partly achieved.25 
                                                 
19  See R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292, 300 (Adam and Crockett JJ); Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 
584, 611 [75]–[76] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
20  Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 375 [39] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); 
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 611 [75] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Barbaro v The 
Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58, 72 [34] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
21  Pesa v The Queen [2012] VSCA 109, [10]–[13] (The Court). 
22  Roger Douglas, in a study of Victorian Magistrates’ Courts, identified 292 relevant sentencing factors: 
Legal Studies Department, La Trobe University, Guilty, Your Worship: A Study of Victoria’s 
Magistrates’ Courts (1980) 62. 
23  Common law aggravating and mitigating considerations continue to apply even in jurisdictions such as 
NSW, which have relatively extensive legislative aggravating and mitigating considerations: R v Way 
(2004) 60 NSWLR 168, 176–7 [43] (The Court). See also s 21A(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 (NSW): ‘The matters referred to in this subsection are in addition to any other matters that are 
required or permitted to be taken into account by the court under any Act or rule of law’. 
24  [2009] 2 Qd R 331. 
25  Ibid 337 [25]. As is noted below, mitigation for injuries sustained by an offender was, in fact, denied in 
this case. 
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1 Injuries Suffered by Offenders during the Offence Due to Their Fault 
There are numerous instances of sentences being reduced on account of 
injuries suffered by offenders during the commission of the offence. In some 
cases, the injuries arose out of the direct conduct of the offender, which had the 
unintentional effect of causing him or her bodily harm. In Alameddine v The 
Queen,26 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal regarded the fact that 
the offender was injured when his drug-making laboratory exploded as a matter 
to be taken into account in mitigation. In a similar vein, in R v Haddara,27 the 
Victorian Court of Appeal held that injuries sustained by an arsonist as a result of 
the fire he lit mitigated penalty – although there was no basis for greater 
mitigation than that accorded by the sentencing judge. 
An offender who kills others while driving dangerously has been held to be 
entitled to mitigation as a result of serious injuries he or she sustains in the 
collision.28 This position has been affirmed in the recent decision of Altun v The 
Queen 29  where the Victorian Court of Appeal (citing the earlier decision of 
Chaplin v The Queen30) noted: 
The court is required to take into account all material facts as required to ensure 
that the punishment the offender receives is what in all the circumstances is an 
appropriate punishment and not an excessive punishment. How much weight a 
judge will give an extra-curial punishment would depend on all the circumstances 
of the case.31 
The courts have taken a stricter approach regarding incidental injuries in the 
form of mental disorders. In Khoja v The Queen,32 the Victorian Court of Appeal 
refused to mitigate a penalty for an offender who killed his friend during an act 
of dangerous driving and who developed a stress disorder and depression as a 
consequence. The Court stated: 
Reactive mental illness of the kind in issue here is hardly ever likely to qualify as 
an injury of the relevant kind. … The trigger for Mr Khoja’s illness … was his 
own reaction to the enormity of his crime, namely, a combination of shame, guilt, 
embarrassment and remorse.33 
 
2 Injuries Which Are Self-inflicted by the Offender 
Mitigation has also not been conferred where the injuries are inflicted 
intentionally by the offender during the offence or at the time of arrest. In 
Christodoulou v The Queen34 it was held that injuries sustained by the offender 
                                                 
26  [2006] NSWCCA 317, [17] (Grove J). Both Kirby and Hislop JJ agreed with Justice Grove’s judgment: 
at [34] (Kirby J), [35] (Hislop J). 
27  (1997) 95 A Crim R 108, 113 (Callaway JA). 
28  Whybrow v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 270. 
29  [2014] VSCA 46. 
30  (2010) 55 MVR 591. 
31  Altun v The Queen [2014] VSCA 46, [10] (Coghlan JA), quoting DPP (Vic) v Altun [2013] VCC 1218, 
[62], citing Chaplin v The Queen (2010) 55 MVR 591, 593–4 [13] (The Court), quoting R v Daetz (2003) 
139 A Crim R 398, 410–11 [62] (The Court). See also Fuller v The Queen [2013] VSCA 186. 
32  (2014) 66 MVR 116. 
33  Ibid 123 [34] (The Court). 
34  [2008] NSWCCA 102. 
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(who was convicted of serious domestic assault offences) as a result of injecting 
himself with acid around the time of the arrest were not mitigating. Justice Grove 
(with whom Johnson J agreed) noted: 
It is a step beyond Alameddine (and Haddara) to seek to extend the availability of 
a mitigatory element to a deliberately self inflicted injury as distinguished from 
occasions where the injury was, although self inflicted and in the course of crime 
commission, unintentional.35 
 
3 Injuries Caused by Others During or After the Offence 
When the injuries to the offender are caused by the deliberate acts of others, 
the effect on sentence is less clear. A number of cases exist where offenders have 
been injured by others who, out of fright, anger or an attempt to stop the offence, 
have acted violently towards the offender. In R v Daetz, a bank robber sustained 
a fractured skull as a result of being attacked by a group of people. In conferring 
a discount, the Court simply noted: 
In sentencing the offender the court takes into account what extra-curial 
punishment the offender has suffered, because the court is required to take into 
account all material facts and is required to ensure that the punishment the 
offender receives is what in all the circumstances is an appropriate punishment 
and not an excessive punishment. How much weight a sentencing judge should 
give any extra-curial punishment will, of course, depend on all the circumstances 
of the case.36 
In R v Barci, it was held that an armed robber who was shot by police 
during the crime should receive a reduced penalty on the basis that ‘[f]or the rest 
of his life, those injuries will serve as a savage reminder to Barci of his 
criminality, and as such, they must fairly be regarded as constituting some 
punishment for that criminality’.37 
R v Webb38 is another case where an offender who was shot by police upon 
being arrested received a reduced sentence as a result of ongoing injuries 
sustained from the shooting. 
  
                                                 
35  Ibid [41] (Grove J), [45] (Johnson J). Justice of Appeal Campbell added: at [5]: 
In my view it is of considerable importance that the applicant’s self-injection with acid, though not in 
itself a criminal act, was intimately bound up with his criminal actions on 20 January 2006. The types of 
detriments that have been recognised as extra curial punishment that can be taken into account as 
mitigating factors have all been detriments that have come to be imposed on the criminal after the crime 
has been committed in retribution for or as a consequence of, his having committed the crime, or 
detriments unintentionally arising from the criminal conduct. I would not expect a matter of mitigation to 
arise from something that was part of the committing of a crime itself – for example, a person who 
engaged a hitman to injure someone would be unlikely to succeed in arguing that it was a mitigating 
factor that he had paid a lot of money to the hitman. In the present case, when the self-inflicted harm is 
intimately bound up with the criminal conduct, and the extent to which it is a serious disability is not well 
established, I see no error in the trial judge not having mentioned it as being a mitigating factor. 
36  (2003) 139 A Crim R 398, 411 [62] (James J). Both Tobias JA and Hulme J agreed with Justice James’ 
judgment: at 399 [1] (Tobias JA), 416 [109] (Hulme J). 
37  (1994) 76 A Crim R 103, 111 (The Court). 
38  (2004) 149 A Crim R 167. 
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However, a more equivocal position was adopted in R v Noble,39 where the 
Queensland Court of Appeal considered whether an armed robber who was shot 
by a shop owner during the commission of an offence should receive a reduced 
sentence. The Court noted the absence of clear authority on the matter, and stated 
that the injury could be taken into account, but found there was no general 
principle that ‘any injury suffered in the course of committing an offence is 
necessarily a factor in sentencing’.40 
Sharpe v The Queen41 even better illustrates the fluidity of the law in this 
area. In this case, mitigation to an offender who was shot in the leg during the 
commission of an offence was not awarded – although the Court noted the injury 
was relatively minor.42 A similar approach was taken in Clinton v The Queen,43 
where the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal refused to reduce the 
sentence of an offender who was attacked by the occupant of a residence, which 
the offender was in the process of ransacking. The Court noted that the offender’s 
injuries required medical attention but were not permanent and the response by 
the occupant was proportionate to the threat posed by the offender.44 
It appears there is no clear temporal limitation between the commission of the 
offence and the occurrence of the injuries required for injuries sustained by an 
offender to be mitigating. The courts have been prepared to mitigate penalty not 
only for harm sustained during the commission of an offence, but also well after 
the offending behavior. Thus, in some cases, courts have reduced a sentence as a 
result of vigilante or other spiteful acts against an offender which occurred well 
after the crime. In R v Allpass,45 the offender was convicted of sexual offences 
against a young girl. After the sexual assault allegations emerged, the offender 
and his wife were subjected to threats and harassment, resulting in the offender 
sustaining psychiatric harm. This was regarded as a mitigating factor. 46  In 
Fernando v Balchin,47 an offender was convicted of spitting at a police officer. 
Following his arrest, the offender was assaulted by police and, on appeal, this 
consideration reduced the term of imprisonment from four to two months.48 
However, the approach to such situations is, again, not uniform. In R v 
Hannigan,49 the Court refused to discount a sentence on account of the fact that 
the offender was assaulted by the police officer who arrested him for dangerous 
driving, two days after the relevant driving incident. The injuries were minor and 
                                                 
39  [1996] 1 Qd R 329. 
40  Ibid 331. See also R v Azar [2004] NSWSC 797. 
41  [2006] NSWCCA 255. 
42  Ibid [67]. See also R v Brunelle (2010) 202 A Crim R 151. 
43  [2009] NSWCCA 276. 
44  Ibid [34] (Howie J). Both Allsop P and Hislop J agreed with Justice Howie’s judgment: at [1] (Allsop P), 
[42] (Hislop J). 
45  (1993) 72 A Crim R 561. 
46  Ibid 566. See also R v Boehmke [2011] QCA 174, where a penalty reduction was accorded to a rapist who 
was assaulted by the victim’s brother. 
47  [2011] NTSC 10. 
48  Ibid [28] (Blokland J). 
49  [2009] 2 Qd R 331. 
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the offender was not aware at the time that he had been assaulted, because of his 
intoxicated condition.50 
Vendettas have been compared to traditional punishment. In R v Jagamara,51 
it was held that traditional forms of punishment can be mitigating. But more 
recently, the High Court in Munda v Western Australia52 has cast doubt on this 
approach: 
There is something to be said for the view that the circumstance that the appellant 
is willing to submit to traditional punishment, and is anxious that this should 
happen, is not a consideration material to the fixing of a proper sentence. 
Punishment for crime is meted out by the state: offenders do not have a choice as 
to the mode of their punishment. … 
[T]his case does not afford an occasion to express a concluded view on the 
question whether the prospect of such punishment is a consideration relevant to 
the imposition of a proper sentence, given that the courts should not condone the 
commission of an offence or the pursuit of vendettas, which are an affront and a 
challenge to the due administration of justice. It is sufficient to say that the 
appellant did not suffer any injustice by reason of the circumstance that the 
prospect of payback was given only limited weight in his favour by the courts 
below.53 
In some instances, the long period between the crime and the injuries has 
resulted in mitigation being denied because a causal connection between the 
events could not be established. Silvano v The Queen is one such case. The New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that injuries inflicted while the 
offender was in jail could not justify a reduced penalty. The Court held: 
In my opinion, it is not sufficient to enable injuries suffered by an offender in 
prison to be taken into account as extra-curial punishment, that the injuries would 
not have been suffered, if the offender had not been arrested and remanded in 
custody as a result of having committed the offences. If such a connection 
between the offences and injuries suffered by a prisoner was sufficient, then 
injuries suffered by a prisoner could be taken into account as extra-curial 
punishment, even if they had resulted merely from some mishap occurring in the 
prison, such as the prisoner accidentally falling.54 
 
4 Summary of Case Law Regarding Mitigating Impact of Injuries Sustained 
by Offenders 
It follows from the above that there are no clear principles or approaches that 
determine whether injuries sustained by an offender are mitigating, even if they 
have some connection to the offence. However, some themes that emerge from 
the cases are that: 
                                                 
50  Ibid 337 [24] (Chesterman JA). 
51  (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, Muirhead J, 28 May 1984), cited in Australian 
Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No 31 (1986) [402]. 
See also R v Minor (1992) 79 NTR 1; Jadurin v The Queen (1982) 44 ALR 424. 
52  (2013) 249 CLR 600. 
53  Ibid 622 [61], [63] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
54  (2008) 184 A Crim R 593, 599 [35] (James J). Both Hislop and Hoeben JJ agreed with Justice James’ 
judgment: at 601 [45] (Hislop J), 601 [46] (Hoeben J). The same conclusion was reached in R v 
O’Connor [2014] NSWCCA 53. 
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 injuries sustained by an offender during the commission of a crime can 
mitigate penalty, especially if they are serious. This is so whether they 
are sustained as a result of the negligence or inadvertence of the offender, 
or as a result of the response by other people to the criminal activity; 
 when the injuries are deliberately self-inflicted, they will generally not 
mitigate penalty; 
 injuries sustained after the commission of an offence can mitigate 
penalty but are less likely to do so where there is a considerable gap 
between the commission of the offence and the infliction of the injuries; 
and  
 to the extent that physical harm sustained by an offender mitigates 
penalty, the key rationales are that (specific) deterrence and retribution 
are already partly achieved. 
 
B   Public Condemnation and Opprobrium 
A common non-curial hardship stemming from criminal offending is 
condemnation and opprobrium. The law is not settled on the impact this should 
have on sentence. It was considered by several members of the High Court in 
Ryan v The Queen,55 but a majority of the Court did not endorse a clear position. 
Kirby and Callinan JJ stated that public opprobrium was a factor which could be 
taken into account to reduce the sanction imposed by the Court, whereas 
McHugh J took the opposite approach. Justice Gummow did not canvass the 
issue, while Hayne J ‘substantially’ agreed with McHugh J.56 Justice Callinan 
stated: 
Of course the abuse of an office to commit a crime is greatly to be deplored but 
the crime of a person occupying an office of some prominence will often attract 
much greater vilification, adverse publicity, public humiliation, and personal, 
social and family stress than a crime by a person not so circumstanced. When 
these consequences are attracted they should not be ignored by the sentencing 
court.57 
Justice Kirby, agreeing with Callinan J, stated: 
stigma [stemming from conviction] … commonly add[s] a significant element of 
shame and isolation to the prisoner and the prisoner’s family. This may comprise a 
special burden that is incidental to the punishment imposed and connected with it. 
If properly based on evidence, it could, in a particular case, be just to take such 
considerations into account in fixing the judicial punishment required.58 
Justice McHugh rejected the relevance of public opprobrium on the basis 
that: 
First, … [t]he opprobrium attaching to offences varies greatly from one offender 
and one offence to another. … 
                                                 
55  (2001) 206 CLR 267. 
56  Ibid 313–14 [157]. 
57  Ibid 319 [177]. 
58  Ibid 304 [123]. See also McDonald v The Queen (1994) 48 FCR 555, 564 (Burchett and Higgins JJ).  
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Secondly, the worse the crime, the greater will be the public stigma and 
opprobrium. The prisoner who rapes a child will undoubtedly be subject to greater 
public opprobrium and stigma than the prisoner who rapes an adult person.59 
In R v Bunning,60 the Victorian Court of Appeal regarded it as mitigating that 
the offender ‘lost his reputation, his career [as a police officer] and … suffered 
public humiliation’.61 In Kenny v The Queen,62 Howie J (with whom Johnson J 
agreed) of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal also stated that 
condemnation could be given some weight if it was so significant as to damage 
the person physically or psychologically. 
In Einfeld v The Queen,63 Basten JA (Hulme and Latham JJ agreeing on this 
issue) endorsed the position in Kenny, and stated that in this case two 
considerations could increase the level of public opprobrium towards the 
offender. The first was the offender’s status as a former judge, which 
(supposedly) made the offence worse and gave rise to an increased level of 
public humiliation. Secondly, the offender used his previous position to advance 
his unlawful purpose.64 
An extensive analysis of the authorities was undertaken in R v Nuttall; Ex 
parte Attorney-General (Qld)65 by Muir JA (with whom Fraser and Chesterman 
JJA agreed). The Court ‘assumed’ public opprobrium was relevant in light of the 
fact that it was not submitted that the sentencing judge failed to take it into 
account, but noted that public humiliation was of little weight given that it was 
inevitable: 
The attainment of high public office brings with it public exposure and media 
scrutiny as well as power, fame and prestige. Criminal abuse of the office, if 
detected, will inevitably attract media attention and result in shame and distress to 
the offender and his family.66 
Thus, the balance of authority indicates that public condemnation of an 
offender can be a mitigating factor but that it generally carries little weight. 
 
C   Employment Deprivations: Dismissal or Loss of Opportunity to Work 
There is no settled principle regarding the relevance of employment 
deprivations to sentence. A number of different approaches have been taken. In 
both Kovacevic v Mills67 and G v Police,68 the sentence was mitigated to avoid 
damage to the offender’s career prospects. There have also been a number of 
                                                 
59  Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267, 284–5 [53], [55]. 
60  [2007] VSCA 205. 
61  Ibid [47] (The Court). 
62  [2010] NSWCCA 6, [49] (Howie J), [53] (Johnson J). See also R v Wilhelm [2010] NSWSC 378. 
63  (2010) 266 ALR 598, 621 [101]. 
64  Ibid 621 [98]–[101]. 
65  [2011] 2 Qd R 328. 
66  Ibid 346 [65] (Muir JA). Both Fraser and Chesterman JJA agreed with Justice of Appeal Muir’s 
judgment: at 349 [80] (Fraser JA), 349 [81] (Chesterman JA). 
67  (2000) 76 SASR 404. 
68  (1999) 74 SASR 165. 
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other instances where sentences have been discounted because of consequential 
damage to career or work prospects.69 
On the other hand, in R v Boskovitz70 and Brewer v Bayens,71 the sanction  
was imposed regardless of the effects on career or work prospects, while in R v 
Liddy [No 2]72 and Hook v Ralphs,73 the sentence was designed or calculated to 
diminish an offender’s career and employment prospects.74 
The strongest statement regarding the supposed irrelevance of reduced 
employment prospects to sentencing is found in the comments of McPherson JA 
in R v Qualischefski.75 His Honour stated: 
The applicant ... claims that a conviction for possession of cannabis will have dire 
consequences for him if it continues to be recorded. It will, he says, lose him his 
job as a computer operator with the Health Department, along with his career, his 
social position and his life style. Those consequences are undoubtedly severe; but, 
if for that reason, appeals like this are allowed and recording of convictions set 
aside, the impact of the administration of justice will in the course of time be no 
less serious. It will mean that we are sanctioning the division of offenders into two 
classes. There will be those with good jobs and careers, enviable social positions 
and prosperous life styles. Their convictions will not be recorded for fear of the 
damage it may do them. Then there will be those without jobs, or career 
prospects, or with standards of living that are already depressed. In their case 
convictions will be recorded. Such an outcome seems to me to be quite wrong and 
thoroughly indefensible. It smacks of privilege, and can only lead to the evolution 
of a special class of persons in society who are exempt from the full operation of 
the criminal law at least at its lower reaches.76 
A similar stance was adopted in Whybrow v The Queen,77 where it was held 
that: 
In my opinion no allowance should be made by reason of alleged extra curial 
punishment flowing from the loss of the applicant’s employment in the Army. The 
deprivation of liberty resulting from a prison term necessarily precludes 
participation in many activities including participation in one’s usual form of 
employment. There was nothing exceptional about the plaintiff’s loss of his 
                                                 
69  See Moorhead v Police [1999] SASC 243; R v Richards (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 119; Ryan v The Queen 
(2001) 206 CLR 267; Simmonds v Bureau of Customs [2001] SASC 306; Hook v Ralphs (1987) 45 SASR 
529; R v McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105; McDonald v The Queen (1994) 48 FCR 555; R v Purdon 
(Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Hunt CJ, McInerney J and Donovan AJ, 27 
March 1997). 
70  [1999] NSWCCA 437. 
71  (2002) 26 WAR 510. The appellant psychologist was convicted of solicitation consequent upon a random 
police sting operation. A conviction was recorded despite (or regardless of) the likely effects on his 
career, PhD studies and occupational contributions to the community: at 512 (The Court). 
72  (2002) 84 SASR 231. 
73  (1987) 45 SASR 529. 
74  In R v Whitnall (1993) 42 FCR 512, the sentence was also increased as a consequence of the defendant’s 
career. 
75  (Unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA, Ambrose J, 12 August 1994) 4. 
This case is discussed in Andrew West, ‘Prospective Loss of Employment as a Factor in Mitigation of 
Penalty’ (1996) 16 Queensland Lawyer 157. 
76  R v Qualischefski (Unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA, Ambrose J, 12 
August 1994) 4 (McPherson JA) (emphasis added). See also R v Bragias (1997) 92 A Crim R 330. 
77  [2008] NSWCCA 270. 
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employment and it was not known if he would resume that employment on the 
completion of his sentence.78 
However, more recently, in R v Nuttall; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld),79 
Muir JA (with whom Fraser and Chesterman JJA agreed) took the view that: ‘the 
respondent’s loss of employment and lack of job prospects on his release are 
relevant considerations.’80 
In some instances courts have been prepared to confer a sentencing discount 
when the loss of employment stems from an offence not committed during the 
course of employment (for example, a lawyer who is convicted of shoplifting) 
but not where the offence is committed in the course of employment (for 
example, a lawyer who steals trust money). In R v Talia it was held that: 
There seems to us to be a distinct difference between a disqualification resulting 
from criminal conduct in the course of the employment from which the person is 
disqualified and criminal conduct remote from that employment but having that 
consequence. … These situations are different to that which obtains [sic] when the 
offending conduct is remote from the employment from which the offender is 
incidentally precluded. In the latter class of case there might be a considerably 
stronger argument in favour of the incidental loss of employment being treated as 
a circumstance of mitigation.81 
Formal disqualifications preventing offenders from being involved in the 
running or management of corporations are often an incident of being  
found guilty of a criminal offence.82 The disqualification follows automatically 
upon conviction and the sentencing court is given no discretion.83 
Again, there is no consistency in principle or approach regarding whether 
disqualification from managing a corporation is a mitigating sentencing 
consideration. Martin and Webster point out that any disqualification or disability 
‘contributes significantly to the social stigma of the finding of guilt or 
conviction’.84 For those offenders whose occupation involved the management of 
a company, the disqualification presents an obvious and significant hardship. 
Courts have recognised this in some cases85 but not in others.86 Arie Freiberg 
observes: ‘[t]he courts have been ambivalent on this issue, sometimes decreasing 
                                                 
78  Ibid [31] (Hislop J). Both Hodgson JA and Kirby J agreed with Justice Hislop’s judgment: at [1] 
(Hodgson JA), [2] (Kirby J). See also FB v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 217. 
79  [2011] 2 Qd R 328. 
80  Ibid 343 [59]. 
81  [2009] VSCA 260, [28] (The Court). 
82  The key provisions are contained in ss 206A and 206B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
83  However, the court has power upon application by the disqualified person to grant leave to manage a 
corporation in the future: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206G. 
84  Richard G Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 526, citing J P Martin and D Webster, The Social Consequences of Conviction 
(Heinemann Educational, 1971). 
85  For example, specific reference to disqualification can be found in R v Chan (2010) 79 ACSR 189, 194 
[20] (Forrest J). 
86  No reference to the statutory disqualification was made at all in R v Hartman (2010) 81 ACSR 121 or R v 
Richard [2011] NSWSC 866. 
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a sentence to take into account the additional detriment and sometimes refusing 
to do so. The cases present no clear pattern.’87 
 
D   Deportation 
Offenders who are not Australian citizens or permanent residents can be 
deported if they fail a ‘character test’. A term of imprisonment of a year or more 
can result in a failure to meet the character test.88 Deportation or the risk of 
deportation is an additional burden that would then be faced by such offenders. 
However, again, there is no consistent approach to the relevance of this in the 
sentencing calculus. Earlier authorities held that it was not relevant.89 However, 
some more recent decisions indicate that it should mitigate. This was the position 
taken in Valayamkandathil v The Queen;90 Guden v The Queen91 and Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Yildirim. 92  However, a different position was taken in 
Ponniah v The Queen93 where Mazza J (with whom Pullin and Buss JJA agreed) 
simply stated ‘in my opinion, the prospect of deportation is not a mitigating 
factor. Whether or not a person is deported is an executive decision’.94 
In Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Peng,95 the Victorian Court of 
Appeal noted that if deportation is to mitigate, the court must be satisfied that 
there is quantifiable risk that deportation will occur and that this would constitute 
a hardship to the offender. 
 
III   AN OVERARCHING THEORY FOR ASSESSING WHETHER 
EXTRA-CURIAL HARDSHIPS SHOULD MITIGATE PENALTY 
The correct approach to factoring extra-curial deprivations into the 
sentencing equation requires consideration of the nature of punishment and the 
objectives of sentencing. The treatment of extra-curial hardships should enhance 
the likelihood of the successful attainment of the objectives of sentencing or, at 
                                                 
87  Arie Freiberg, ‘Sentencing White-Collar Criminals’ (Paper presented at the Fraud Prevention and Control 
Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology, Surfers Paradise, 24–25 August 2000) 12 
<http://aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/fraud/freiberg.pdf> (citations omitted). 
88  See Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2), which is discussed in Darcie v The Queen [2012] VSCA 11, 
[32]–[37] (Williams AJA). Justice of Appeal Buchanan agreed with Williams AJA: at [1]. 
89  R v Pham [2005] NSWCCA 94, [13] (Wood CJ at CL). Both Hislop and Johnson JJ agreed with Chief 
Justice Wood’s judgment: at [46] (Hislop J), [47] (Johnson J). See also R v Shrestha (1991) 173 CLR 48, 
71–2 (Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
90  [2010] VSCA 260, [25]–[27] (Neave JA). Justice of Appeal Buchanan agreed: at [44]. 
91  (2010) 28 VR 288, 294–5 [25]–[26] (The Court). 
92  [2011] VSCA 219, [26] (Warren CJ). Both Buchanan and Sifris JJA agreed with Chief Justice Warren’s 
judgment: at [34] (Buchanan JA), [35] (Sifris JA). The NSW Law Reform Commission, in its report on 
sentencing recommended that the risk of deportation should be irrelevant to sentence: New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 139 (2013) 95. 
93  [2011] WASCA 105. 
94  Ibid [48] (Mazza J) (citations omitted). Both Pullin and Buss JJA agreed with Justice Mazza’s judgment: 
at [1] (Pullin JA), [2] (Buss JA). 
95  [2014] VSCA 128, [23] (Nettle and Redlich JJA). Justice of Appeal Priest agreed: at [42]. 
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least, not comprise or undermine the pursuit of them. This is the doctrinally 
sound manner in which to approach this issue. However, this approach is 
complicated by the multifaceted nature of the objectives of sentencing; their lack 
of clarity; sometimes conflicting direction; and the fact that irrespective of which 
objectives are pursued, ultimately the issue of how much punishment should be 
administered is mainly driven by the principle of proportionality. In fact, the key 
to evaluating the place of extra-curial punishment in the role of sentencing relates 
to the extent to which it impacts on the proportionality principle. These premises 
are now examined. 
 
A   Current Evidence Suggests That the Sentencing System Cannot Achieve 
Several Key Objectives 
As noted previously, each Australian jurisdiction endorses the same  
key objectives of sentencing in the form of community protection  
(or incapacitation 96 ), general deterrence, specific deterrence, retribution and 
rehabilitation. 97  These objectives provide possible rationales for imposing 
sanctions on offenders. In analysing the proper role of extra-curial punishment to 
sentencing, it is tenable to do so from two perspectives. The first is by reference 
to the existing orthodox goals of sentencing. The second is against the backdrop 
of the justifiable purposes of sentencing. As it transpires, for the purposes of this 
discussion it is irrelevant which perspective is chosen. 
There has been a voluminous amount of empirical research into the efficacy 
of state-imposed punishment to achieve the goals of incapacitation, general and 
specific deterrence, and rehabilitation. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
consider these findings at length. However, the trend of the findings is relatively 
consistent and hence it is possible to provide an overview of the relevant 
literature. In short, the weight of the current empirical evidence provides no basis 
for confidence that punishment is capable of achieving the goals of incapacitation 
and specific deterrence. General deterrence works only in the absolute sense, and 
there remains considerable uncertainty on the capacity of the sentencing system 
to rehabilitate offenders. 
Incapacitating offenders in prison is the most effective form of community 
protection given that offenders cannot commit crime in the community during 
their period of confinement. However, incapacitation is only necessary if the 
offender would have reoffended if he or she were not incarcerated. Incapacitation 
in its broadest sense (as being applicable to all offenders and all offence types) is 
                                                 
96  Incapacitation and community protection are often used interchangeably – incapacitation is the most 
effective means of protecting the community from offenders (at least during the period of their detention). 
97  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A; Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 3, 9; 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 3; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
s 5; cf Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6 (which merely lists community protection). Other stated objectives 
included denunciation and retribution. It has been argued that, in effect, both of these equate to the goal of 
proportionality: see Mirko Bagaric, ‘The Negation of Venting in Australian Sentencing: Denouncing 
Denunciation and Retribution’ (2014) 88 Australian Law Journal 502. 
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flawed, since we are poor at predicting which offenders are likely to commit 
offences in the future (especially in relation to serious offences) 98  and while 
incapacitation seems to work in the case of certain categories of minor offences, 
the cost of imprisoning minor offenders normally outweighs the seriousness of 
the offence.99 To the extent that incapacitation is justifiable, it should be confined 
to recidivist serious sexual and violent offenders, where a recidivist loading of 
20–50 per cent should be applied, given that is consistent with their rate of 
reoffending.100 
Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by punishing individual 
offenders for their transgressions and, thereby, convincing them that crime does 
not pay.101 It attempts to dissuade offenders from reoffending by inflicting an 
unpleasant experience on them (such as imprisonment), which they will (at least 
in theory) seek to avoid in the future.102 The available empirical data suggest that 
specific deterrence does not work. There is nothing to suggest that offenders who 
have been subjected to harsh punishment are less likely to reoffend than 
identically-placed offenders who are subjected to lesser forms of punishment. 
                                                 
98  See Jessica Black, ‘Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?’ (2011) 6 Journal of 
Applied Security Research 317, 322–3. The most thorough treatment of the subject matter is Bernadette 
McSherry and Patrick Keyzer (eds), Dangerous People: Policy, Prediction and Practice (Routledge, 
2011). See also Bernadette McSherry and Patrick Keyzer, Sex Offenders and Preventive Detention: 
Politics, Policy and Practice (Federation Press, 2009). 
99  William Spelman, ‘What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us about Imprisonment and Crime’ (2000) 
27 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 419, 420, 485; Roger K Warren, ‘Evidence-based 
Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and 
Policy’ (2009) 43 University of San Francisco Law Review 585, 594; National Research Council of the 
National Academies, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and 
Consequences (National Academies Press, 2014) 4; Pew Charitable Trusts, Prison and Crime: A Complex 
Link – Crime Drop since 1994 Has Been Bigger in States That Cut Imprisonment Rates (11 September 
2014) <http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/prison-and-crime>; Don 
Weatherburn, Jiuzhao Hua and Steve Moffatt, ‘How Much Crime does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation 
Effect of Prison on Burglary’ (Crime and Justice Bulletin No 93, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research, January 2006); Jacqueline Cohen, ‘The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: A Critical 
Review of the Literature’ in Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen and Daniel Nagin (eds), Deterrence and 
Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (National Academy of 
Sciences, 1978) 187, 209. See also Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (eds), The Crime Drop in 
America (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
100  Mirko Bagaric, ‘The Punishment Should Fit the Crime – Not the Prior Convictions of the Person that 
Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in 
Sentencing’ (2014) 51 San Diego Law Review 343, 416. 
101  Daniel S Nagin, Francis T Cullen and Cheryl Lero Jonson, ‘Imprisonment and Reoffending’ (2009) 38 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 115. 
102  See Donald Ritchie, Sentencing Advisory Council (Vic), Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the 
Evidence (Report, April 2011); Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions 
to Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the 
Implications for Sentencing’ (2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 159. 
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Thus, there is no basis for pursuing the goal of specific deterrence.103 The weight 
of evidence suggests that rehabilitation fares slightly better. Certain rehabilitative 
techniques have some degree of success for some offenders, but there are no data 
to show that there are wide-ranging techniques to reform all offenders.104 
The findings regarding general deterrence are also relatively settled.105 The 
existing data show that in the absence of the threat of any punishment for 
criminal conduct, the social fabric of society would readily dissipate because 
crime would escalate and overwhelmingly frustrate the capacity of people to lead 
happy and fulfilled lives. Thus, general deterrence works in the absolute sense: 
there is a connection between the existence of some form of criminal sanctions 
and criminal conduct (ie, absolute deterrence). However, there is insufficient 
evidence to support a direct correlation between higher penalties and a reduction 
in the crime rate. It follows that marginal deterrence (which is the theory that 
there is a direct correlation between the severity of the sanction and the 
prevalence of an offence) should be disregarded as a sentencing objective, at 
least unless and until there is proof that it works.106 
The failure of marginal general deterrence means that absolute general 
deterrence justifies inflicting some punishment on offenders, but it is of little 
relevance in fixing the amount of punishment. It follows that based on the 
existing empirical data, the goal of incapacitation should be pursued more 
sparingly; specific deterrence and marginal general deterrence should be 
abolished as sentencing objectives and rehabilitation should not influence 
                                                 
103  Nagin, Cullen and Jonson, above n 101; Don Weatherburn, ‘The Effect of Prison on Adult Re-offending’ 
(Crime and Justice Bulletin No 143, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, August 2010); 
Ritchie, above n 102; Donald P Green and Daniel Winik, ‘Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate 
the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism among Drug Offenders’ (2010) 48 Criminology 
357, 357–8; Franklin E Zimring and Gordon J Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control 
(University of Chicago Press, 1973) 14. See also New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
Sentencing, Report No 139 (2013) 33–4. 
104  Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre, ‘Prison-based Correctional Offender Rehabilitation 
Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia’ (Report No 112, Australian Institute of Criminology, 
2011); Mark W Lipsey and Francis T Cullen, ‘The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A 
Review of Systematic Reviews’ (2007) 3 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 297; Michael S King, 
‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Initiatives in Australia and New Zealand and the Overseas Experience’ 
(2011) 21 Journal of Judicial Administration 19. 
105  For an overview of the literature, see Nigel Walker, Sentencing in a Rational Society (Allen Lane, 1969) 
ch 4, but see especially: at 60–1; John K Cochran, Mitchell B Chamlin and Mark Seth, ‘Deterrence or 
Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment’ (1994) 32 
Criminology 107, 129; Dale O Cloninger and Roberto Marchesini, ‘Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-
controlled Group Experiment’ (2001) 33 Applied Economics 569; Dieter Dölling et al, ‘Is Deterrence 
Effective? Results of a Meta-analysis of Punishment’ (2009) 15 European Journal on Criminal Policy 
and Research 201; Anthony N Doob and Cheryl Marie Webster, ‘Sentence Severity and Crime: 
Accepting the Null Hypothesis’ (2003) 30 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 143; Steven D 
Levitt, ‘Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that 
Do Not’ (2004) 18(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 163, 177–8; Ritchie, above n 102; Richard Berk, 
‘New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?’ (2005) 2 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 303. 
106  See Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘(Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work – And What It 
Means for Sentencing’ (2011) 35 Criminal Law Journal 269. 
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sentencing outcomes unless and until it is demonstrated that it is possible to 
prompt internal attitudinal reform of offenders while at the same time imposing 
hardships on them. 
 
B   Proportionality Is the Key To Determining Sentence Length 
It follows from the foregoing that there is a discordance between the current 
objectives of punishment and the objectives that are empirically valid. However, 
irrespective of which reference point is adopted, the same conclusions follow for 
the purposes of this discussion. From either perspective the system of state-
imposed sanctions is justified. Given that absolute general deterrence works in 
practice, it is appropriate to impose hardships on offenders. In addition to this, on 
the basis of either the accepted objectives of sentencing or the empirically 
validated objectives, when it comes to the issue of how much to punish, the 
guiding determinant is the principle of proportionality.107 
 
1 Statement of the Proportionality Principle 
In its crudest form the principle of proportionality is that the punishment 
must fit the crime. A clear statement of the principle is found in the High Court 
case of Hoare v The Queen: 
[A] basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed 
by a court should never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in the light of its objective 
circumstances.108 
In Veen v The Queen109 and Veen v The Queen [No 2],110 the High Court 
stated that proportionality is the primary aim of sentencing. It is considered so 
important that it cannot be trumped even by the goal of community protection, 
which at various times has also been declared as the most important aim of 
sentencing.111 
Further, retributive scholars (who reject the goals of incapacitation, 
rehabilitation and specific deterrence as underpinning punishment) endorse 
proportionality as the central tenet of our sentencing system.112 In fact, the view 
that the severity of the punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of 
the offence is one of the few principles in the area of punishment and sentencing 
which enjoys widespread acceptance by philosophers, legislatures and the 
                                                 
107  See also the discussion in Part III(B)(1)–(2) below. 
108  (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354 (The Court) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
109  (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467 (Stephen J). 
110  (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
111  See, eg, Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433. 
112  Jami L Anderson, ‘Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism’ (1997) 16(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 
13; Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of 
Criminals (Rutgers University Press, 1985) ch 1; Jesper Ryberg, The Ethics of Proportionate 
Punishment: A Critical Investigation (Kluwer Academic, 2004) 2; Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Athlone Press, first published 1789–1823, 1970 ed) 165. 
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courts.113 The primacy of proportionality is underlined by the fact that it has been 
given statutory recognition in all Australian jurisdictions.114 
This is not to suggest that proportionality is the only determinant in setting an 
appropriate penalty. As noted above, studies have shown that there are hundreds 
of aggravating and mitigating factors which can influence the choice of sanction 
and its severity.115 Moreover, even though empirical evidence casts doubt on the 
efficacy of sentencing to achieve several of its stated objectives, in practice, these 
objectives continue to influence sentence type and severity. Thus, for example, 
(marginal) general deterrence is an especially important consideration in relation 
to drug116 and many property offences,117 where it operates to increase penalty, 
whereas the goal of rehabilitation often serves to reduce the penalty in relation to 
certain types of offenders, especially those who are young. 118  While these 
                                                 
113  Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (Cavendish, 2001) ch 5. 
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(2010) 205 A Crim R 106; DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1. 
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VSCA 176, [21] (Kaye AJA). Both Buchanan and Neave JJA agreed with Acting Justice of Appeal 
Kaye’s judgment: at [1] (Buchanan JA), [2]–[4] (Neave JA). See also Mackenzie and Stobbs, above n 8, 
ch 4.  
118  R v Kane [1974] VR 759, 766–7 (The Court); R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587, 589 (King CJ), with whom 
Cox and O’Loughlin JJ agreed: at 590; Mason v Pryce (1988) 34 A Crim R 1, 9 (Kearney J); Duca v 
Police (1999) 73 SASR 15. 
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objectives continue to influence the choice of sanction, they cannot take the 
sentence outside the bounds of a proportionate sentence.119 
 
2 The Components of Proportionality 
The key aspect of the principle is that it has two limbs. The first is the 
seriousness of the crime; the second is the harshness of the sanction. Further, the 
principle has a quantitative component – the two limbs must be matched. In order 
for the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be equal to the 
harshness of the penalty. 
Despite the clarity with which the principle can be expressed, there are no 
well-defined and precise criteria regarding the manner in which proportionate 
sentences are determined. The key reason is that legislatures and the courts have 
not developed a workable methodology for matching the two limbs of the 
principle. For example, how many years of imprisonment correlate to the pain 
endured by a rape victim? As noted by Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, in 
developing their ‘living standard approach’ to offence seriousness,120 ‘[v]irtually 
no legal doctrines have been developed on how the gravity of harms can be 
compared.’121 
The main difficulty with giving content to the proportionality principle is that 
the currencies in each limb, which are supposed to match up, are normally 
different. The interests typically violated by criminal offences are physical 
integrity and property rights. At the upper end of criminal sanctions, the currency 
is (deprivation of) freedom. These theoretical complexities do not need to be 
                                                 
119  Unless there is express statutory authority permitting a disproportionate penalty. Some statutory 
incursions into the proportionality principle have also occurred, mainly stemming from the trend towards 
tougher sentences. In Victoria, for example, serious sexual, drug, arson or violent offenders may receive 
sentences in excess of that which is proportionate to the offence: see Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) pt 2A; 
see especially at s 6D(b). Serious offenders are, essentially, those who have previously been sentenced to 
jail for a similar type of offence, except in the case of serious sexual offenders, where the offender must 
have two prior sexual matters or a sexual and a violent offence arising from the same incident. Indefinite 
jail terms may also be imposed for offenders convicted of ‘serious offences’: at ss 18A–18P. Serious 
offences include certain homicide offences, rape, serious assault, kidnapping and armed robbery, where 
the court is satisfied ‘to a high degree of probability’ that the offender is a serious danger to the 
community: at ss 3, 18B(1). Similar provisions to those operating in Victoria regarding serious violent 
and sexual offenders exist in other jurisdictions: Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 163; 
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 65; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 23; Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas) s 19; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 98. Indefinite sentences also exist in other jurisdictions: see, eg, 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) pt 10; Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW); 
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) ss 65–78; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) ss 98–101; Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Act 1988 (SA) pt 2 div III; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 392. The Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual 
Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) goes one step further and allows for preventive detention of offenders who 
have completed their sentence if there is a high degree of probability that they are a serious danger to the 
community (the constitutional validity of this Act was upheld by the High Court in Fardon v A-G (Qld) 
(2004) 223 CLR 575). For a discussion of the Queensland provision, see Mackenzie and Stobbs, above n 
8, 210–11. See also Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 23. However, these exceptions do not 
debunk the general rule that proportionality is the main sentencing consideration. 
120  Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, ‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis’ (1991) 11 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
121  Ibid 3. 
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resolved for the purposes of this article. First, it has been suggested that the 
issues are not insurmountable and that a way forward to giving proportionality 
greater clarity is to evaluate both limbs of the equation, focusing on the extent to 
which the interests of offenders and victims are set back by various offences and 
penalty types. 122  Secondly, pragmatic concerns regarding the content of the 
proportionality principle are clear and there are mechanisms which, to some 
extent, already adjust for this vagueness. 
Hence, in relation to sentencing outcomes, current orthodoxy maintains that 
there is no single correct sentence in any case123 and that a lawful sentence is a 
matter upon which ‘reasonable minds will differ’.124 Under this model, courts can 
impose a sentence within an ‘available range’ of penalties. The spectrum of this 
range is not clearly designated, however, if the tariff is not observed, the sentence 
can be overturned on appellate review as being either ‘manifestly excessive’125 or 
‘manifestly inadequate’.126 The spectrum of sanctions that are regarded as within 
the acceptable range or tariff is circumscribed by the proportionality principle.127 
Thus, while there are a large number of considerations that impact on the judicial 
choice of penalty, the overarching determinant, or control point, is the 
proportionality principle. It is important to work within the contours of this 
(albeit) opaque principle, as opposed to railing against its applicability. 
 
3 Extra-curial Hardships as Impacting on the Hardship Limb of 
Proportionality instead of Discrete Mitigating Factors 
Given that proportionality is the lynchpin determinant for setting penalty type 
and severity, it follows that an obvious means through which extra-curial 
hardships could influence penalty is whether they can be accommodated within 
the proportionality thesis. Alternatively, it could be contended that, instead, 
extra-curial hardships could be incorporated into the sentencing calculus as 
discrete mitigating considerations. 
Mitigating factors can be divided into four main types: the circumstances of 
the offence; the offender’s response to a charge; matters personal to the offender; 
and the impact of the sanction on the offender and his or her dependants.128 
                                                 
122  See also Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles 
(Oxford University Press, 2005). 
123  Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357. 
124  Hudson v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 199, 206 (The Court). 
125  ‘The relevant test for the applicant to succeed on this ground [manifest excess] requires the applicant to 
demonstrate that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust’: Melham v The Queen [2011] 
NSWCCA 121, [85], citing Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321, 325 [6] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne 
J). 
126  For discussion of this concept, see R v Creighton [2011] ACTCA 13; R v Hill [2010] SASCFC 79; R v 
Holland (2011) 205 A Crim R 429, 443 [63] (Schmidt J), quoting Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 
538–9 [59]–[61] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); R v Sukkar [2011] 
NSWCCA 140; R v McHarg [2011] NSWCCA 115, [122]–[124] (Johnson J). Both Whealy JA and 
Hidden J agreed with Justice Johnson’s judgment: at [1] (Whealy JA), [2] (Hidden J). 
127  See, eg, Van Der Baan v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 5. 
128  See generally Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 1979) 453–4. 
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However, there is no universally accepted theory of aggravation or mitigation.129 
Accordingly, the stability and authority of many such factors is not firmly 
established and remains subject to revision.130 
The fourth category of mitigating factors (so far as it relates to the offender as 
opposed to his or her dependants) could potentially justify incorporating extra-
curial hardship. This is the case if the impact of the sanction, such as a fine or 
imprisonment, is broadened to include the effect it will have on the offender who 
has suffered somewhat already due to the extra-curial punishment. And, as we 
have seen, there are shades of this approach in some of the cases, with comments 
to the effect that an extra-curial event should mitigate because the offender has 
already experienced suffering. 
Thus, doctrinally, there are two means by which extra-curial hardships could 
be incorporated into the sentencing discretion: as a component of the 
proportionality principle or as a discrete mitigating consideration. On balance, it 
is more doctrinally and institutionally sound if incidental harms are viewed 
through the lens of the proportionality principle as opposed to being a discrete 
mitigating consideration. This would make the role of extra-curial events more 
stable given that there is no accepted coherent theory of aggravating or mitigating 
considerations – hence, it is difficult doctrinally to entrench a consideration as 
being incontestably mitigatory. Evaluating the concept of extra-curial hardships 
from the perspective of the proportionality principle potentially grounds them 
within a well-established construct and in a manner where its role is clear: to 
inform more fully the sanction severity side of the proportionality equation. 
Incorporating such concepts within the principle is also in keeping with existing 
orthodoxy, where a number of other aggravating and mitigating considerations 
have been held to be an inherent aspect of the proportionality principle. 
To this end, some factors which have already been identified as relevant to 
offence seriousness include: the consequences of the offence, including the level 
of harm; the offender’s culpability;131 the protection of society;132 and even the 
offender’s previous criminal history.133 
In order for extra-curial sanctions to be relevant to the sanction side of the 
proportionality thesis, they can only validly impact on penalty if they constitute a 
form of punishment that is properly recognisable from the sentencing 
perspective: the punishment (not the extra-curial matter) must fit the crime. Thus, 
the key consideration is whether, in fact, extra-curial hardships constitute 
punishment. 
 
                                                 
129  For an attempt to construct such a theory, see Mirko Bagaric, ‘A Rational Theory of Mitigation and 
Aggravation in Sentencing: Why Less Is More When It Comes to Punishing Criminals’ (2014) 62 Buffalo 
Law Review 1159. 
130  Victorian Sentencing Committee, Sentencing: Report of the Victorian Sentencing Committee (Victorian 
Attorney-General’s Department, 1988) vol 1, ch 5. 
131  For example, whether it was intentional, reckless or negligent. 
132  Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 474 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
133  R v Mulholland (1991) 1 NTLR 1, 13 (Angel J). 
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4 For an Incidental Hardship To Impact on Proportionality It Must 
Constitute ‘Punishment’ 
This inquiry is complicated by the fact that there is no universally accepted 
definition of punishment.134 In defining punishment, some commentators focus 
on its association with guilt. Thus, Herbert Morris defines punishment as ‘the 
imposition upon a person who is believed to be at fault of something commonly 
believed to be a deprivation where that deprivation is justified by the person’s 
guilty behaviour’.135 Duff defines punishment as ‘the infliction of suffering on a 
member of the community who has broken its laws’;136 and, similarly, McTaggart 
defines punishment as ‘the infliction of pain on a person because he has done 
wrong’.137 
A wider definition is provided by Nigel Walker, who observes that while 
punishment generally requires that the offender has voluntarily committed the 
relevant act, it is sufficient that the punisher believes or pretends to believe that 
he or she has done so.138 This definition better reflects this aspect of punishment, 
given that there is no question that accused who are wrongly convicted and 
sentenced by courts undergo punishment. However, what is notable for the 
purpose of this discussion is that the above definitions, while focusing on the 
aspect of guilt, nevertheless, require that the punishment is for the crime, that is, 
there is the implicit requirement of a causal link between the two subject matters. 
This link emerges also in relation to commentators who focus on the 
connection with blame as being cardinal to the concept of punishment. Andrew 
von Hirsch states that ‘[p]unishing someone consists of visiting a deprivation 
(hard treatment) on him, because he supposedly has committed a wrong, in a 
manner that expresses disapprobation on the person for his conduct’, 139  or 
‘[p]unishing someone consists of doing something painful or unpleasant to him, 
because he has purportedly committed a wrong, under circumstances and in a 
manner that conveys disapprobation of the offender for his wrong.’140 Further, it 
has been noted by John Kleinig that: 
[P]unishment … involves a stigmatizing condemnation of the punished. It does so, 
because the person has been judged to be guilty inter alia of some moral wrong-
                                                 
134  To this end, certainly the courts have not attempted to set out an authoritative definition: see Chong, 
Fellows and Richards, above n 3, 381. 
135  Herbert Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’ in Stanley E Grupp (ed), Theories of Punishment (Indiana 
University Press, 1971) 76, 83. 
136  R A Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge University Press, 1986) 267. See also at 151, where Duff 
states that punishment is suffering imposed on an offender for an offence by a duly constituted authority. 
137  John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (Cambridge University Press, 1901) 
129. 
138  Nigel Walker, Why Punish? (Oxford University Press, 1991) 2. 
139  Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Censure and Proportionality’ in Antony Duff and David Garland (eds), A Reader on 
Punishment (Oxford University Press, 1994) 115, 118 (emphasis added). 
140  von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes, above n 112, 35. See also Ten, who states that punishment is not 
merely the imposition of unpleasantness on the offender: ‘the imposition is made to express disapproval 
or condemnation of the offender’s conduct which is a breach of what is regarded as a desirable and 
obligatory standard of conduct’: C L Ten, Crime, Guilt and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction 
(Clarendon Press, 1987) 2. 
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doing, that is, of violating basic conditions of our human engagement. ... 
[P]unishment is for … a breach of standards that are believed to be of fundamental 
significance in our human intercourse.141 
Apart from the alleged requirement of guilt and the tendency of punishment 
to condemn, another common definitional trait is the assumption that punishment 
must be imposed by a person in authority. For example, Hobbes provides that 
punishment is an: 
[e]vill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that 
which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the law; to the end 
that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience. ... [T]he aym 
of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour …142 
Honderich defines punishment as ‘an authority’s infliction of a penalty, 
something involving deprivation or distress, on an offender, someone found to 
have broken a rule, for an offence, an act of the kind prohibited by the rule’143 
and, in the postscript to the same book, written over a decade later, as ‘that 
practice whereby a social authority visits penalties on offenders, one of its 
deliberate aims being to do so.’144 If the imposition of the punishment by an 
authority is essential, it follows that most forms of extra-curial punishment are 
not relevant to sentencing. 
Some scholars have defined punishment in terms of pain. Bentham simply 
declared that ‘all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil’;145 Ten 
states that punishment ‘involves the infliction of some unpleasantness on the 
offender, or it deprives the offender of something valued.’146 Others have placed 
somewhat emotive emphasis on the hurt that punishment seeks to bring about. 
Punishment has been described as pain delivery,147 and, similarly, it has been 
asserted that ‘[t]he intrinsic point of punishment is that it should hurt – that it 
should inflict suffering, hardship or burdens’. 148  Walker is somewhat more 
expansive regarding the type of evils which can constitute punishment: 
punishment ‘involves the infliction of something which is assumed to be 
unwelcome to the recipient: the inconvenience of a disqualification, the hardship 
of incarceration, the suffering of a flogging, exclusion from the country or 
community, or in extreme cases, death.’149 
                                                 
141  John Kleinig, ‘The Hardness of Hard Treatment’, in Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (eds), 
Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch (Clarendon Press, 1998) 
273, 275 (emphasis in original). For a fuller account of Kleinig’s definition of punishment, see John 
Kleinig, Punishment and Desert (Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) ch 2; see especially at 41–2. 
142  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Penguin, first published 1651, 1968 ed) 353, 355 (emphasis added). 
143  Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Penguin, revised ed, 1984) 15 (emphasis in 
original). 
144  Ibid 208 (emphasis added). 
145  Bentham, above n 112, 158. 
146  Ten, Crime, Guilt and Punishment, above n 140, 2. 
147  Nils Christie, Limits to Pain (Martin Robertson, 1981) 19, 48. 
148  Anthony Duff, ‘Punishment, Citizenship and Responsibility’ in Henry Tam (ed), Punishment, Excuses 
and Moral Development (Avebury, 1996) 17, 18. 
149  Walker, Why Punish?, above n 138, 1. 
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H L A Hart is even more comprehensive, and in his definition he includes all 
of the features adverted to above. According to Hart, the features of punishment 
are that: 
1. It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered 
unpleasant. 
2. It must be for an offence against legal rules. 
3. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence. 
4. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender. 
5. It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a 
legal system against which the offence is committed.150 
 
5 Preferred Definition of Punishment 
Thus, there are numerous definitions of punishment. Most of them involve 
concepts which negate the possibility of extra-curial hardships coming within the 
scope of the concept. Extra-curial hardship, while it constitutes a deprivation, is 
not imposed by an authority and does not require blame to be projected at the 
offender. Furthermore, in most instances, there is no need for the offender to be 
found guilty of an offence. However, these observations are not necessarily 
decisive against such deprivations being instances of punishment: the accounts of 
punishment which leave little scope for the operation of extra-curial hardships 
might be flawed. Additionally, there is a logical distinction between the 
definition of a term at its literal and justificatory levels. However, in order to 
reject orthodox understandings of concepts, it is necessary to set out concrete 
reasons for doing so: explanation and justification are often closely linked. It is to 
these issues that we now turn. 
From the above accounts of punishments, it seems there is consensus on two 
points. First, that punishment involves some type of unpleasantness and, 
secondly, that it is on account of actual or perceived wrongdoing. 
The requirement that punishment must be imposed by a person in authority is 
less obvious. Walker takes the view that punishment can be ordered by anyone 
who is regarded as having the right to do so, such as certain members of a society 
or family,151 not merely a formal legal authority, and that punishment stems not 
only from violation of legal rules, but extends to infringements of social rules  
or customs. 152  This would seem to accord with general notions regarding 
punishment and, indeed, there would appear to be many parallels between, say, 
family discipline and legal punishment.153 As Walker points out, punishment need 
not be by the state. It has different names depending on the forum in which it is 
                                                 
150  H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Clarendon Press, 1968) 4–
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151  Walker, Why Punish?, above n 138, 2. 
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imposed, adding that: ‘When imposed by the English-speaking courts it is called 
“sentencing”. In the Christian Church it is “penance”. In schools, colleges, 
professional organizations, clubs, trade unions, and armed forces its name is 
“disciplining” or “penalizing”.’154 
Thus, in principle there does not appear to be any reason that the practice of 
punishment does not extend to other situations (ie, those beyond the court 
setting) where the punisher is in a position of dominance, for example, where the 
punisher is a teacher, parent or employer. 
Guilt and blame are also not intrinsic features of punishment. Innocent people 
who are wrongly convicted and imprisoned are nevertheless punished. Blame is a 
broader concept than guilt but probably still not essential for punishment to 
occur. Nearly all criminal behaviour engenders a degree of blame, but there are 
some types of behaviour where it is arguably lacking. An example is ‘mercy 
killing’ (ie, active voluntary euthanasia) which, strictly speaking, is murder but 
may not attract condemnation.155 A more modest, and accurate, ingredient of this 
requirement in the context of punishment is that it is imposed for a wrong.156 
Thus, core aspects of punishment are that it consists of a hardship or 
deprivation; the taking away of something of value157 for a wrong actually or 
perceived to have been committed.158 Typically, this would be administered by 
another person, although it is not clear whether that is essential. 
The first requirement is incontestable: an experience which benefits an 
individual or has no impact on them is not punishment. The second requirement 
is less germane but nevertheless essential. Without this stipulation, any 
experience that constituted a detriment could be termed a punishment. However, 
it is not credible to describe an illness, failure in an exam or marriage break-up, 
as a form of punishment. 
Thus, in order for a hardship to constitute a form of punishment, it must be a 
form of deprivation and there must be some connection between the deprivation 
and violation of a social norm (or law). These concepts are developed further 
                                                 
154  Walker, Why Punish?, above n 138, 1. See also Kleinig, Punishment and Desert, above n 141, 17–22. 
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2016 The Irrelevance to Sentencing of (Most) Incidental Hardships 73 
below in the context of considering the relevance of each form of extra-curial 
hardship in the sentencing inquiry. 
 
IV   APPLYING THE OVERARCHING THEORY 
A   Public Opprobrium and Shame Should Not Reduce Penalty 
We commence the discussion in this section with further consideration of 
public opprobrium. The appropriate response to the relevance of extra-curial 
punishment in the form of public opprobrium is the most straightforward. 
Criminal conduct normally attracts a degree of condemnation and opprobrium. In 
fact, it has been held that denunciation (which is the catalyst for opprobrium) is 
an important goal of sentencing. In Channon v The Queen, Brennan J said that 
‘[p]unishment is the means by which society marks its disapproval of criminal 
conduct’.159 Justice Kirby stated that in addition to expressing disapproval of the 
conduct, denunciation also expresses the message that the conduct must be 
punished: 
A fundamental purpose of the criminal law, and of the sentencing of convicted 
offenders, is to denounce publicly the unlawful conduct of an offender. This 
objective requires that a sentence should also communicate society’s 
condemnation of the particular offender’s conduct. The sentence represents ‘a 
symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for 
encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our 
substantive criminal law’.160 
Denunciation is a common law sentencing objective, as well as being an 
express objective of several sentencing statutes.161 
Given that sentencing aims to elicit denunciation and opprobrium, it is 
contradictory to claim that this very goal should, at the same time, be a basis for 
mitigation. This incongruity has been noted by Hayne J162 who observed in Ryan 
v The Queen: ‘There is an irreducible tension between the proposition that 
offending behaviour is worthy of punishment and condemnation according to its 
gravity, and the proposition that the offender is entitled to leniency on account of 
that condemnation.’163 
The role of opprobrium in the sentencing calculus could, potentially, be 
salvaged if it were established that, in fact, denunciation should not be an 
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objective of sentencing.164 However, even if this revisionary approach is endorsed 
there is still no role for opprobrium as a mitigating consideration. 
Opprobrium can emanate from numerous sources including family, friends, 
associates or the wider community. The level of opprobrium directed towards an 
offender depends mainly on the offence type and the notoriety of the offender. 
While it comes in degrees, it cannot ever be accurately measured or quantified. 
This matter is also noted by McHugh J in Ryan v The Queen, who states that 
giving weight to opprobrium in the sentencing calculus is unsound because: 
it would seem to place a burden on the sentencing judge which would be nearly 
impossible to discharge. The opprobrium attaching to offences varies greatly from 
one offender and one offence to another. How a judge could realistically take such 
a matter into account is not easy to see.165 
Opprobrium has no physical presence or force and can be ignored by a 
strident and resolute offender. Hardships that cannot be measured and whose 
impact can be negated to naught by offenders do not satisfy the most important 
requirement of punishment: that they must hurt.166 Opprobrium should therefore 
not be a mitigating consideration in sentencing. 
 
B   Injuries Sustained While Offending 
The most obvious and impactful form of harm that can be inflicted on an 
offender associated with an offence is physical injury. As we have seen, given 
the precarious nature of many criminal activities, this is not an irregular 
occurrence. Injuries suffered during the offending occur in either one of two 
relatively well-defined ways: (i) negligence by the offender, for example, as a 
result of an explosion in a drug laboratory; or (ii) self-defence or other responses 
by police or bystanders to a crime. Post-offence injuries to offenders typically 
stem from (iii) vigilante conduct (either in the community or in jail); or (iv) 
traditional punishment. 
While there is no clear approach to the availability of sentencing discounts in 
relation to these matters, as we have seen, the weight of authority suggests that 
they normally mitigate sentence. It is contended that this approach is unsound. 
While injuries sustained by an offender satisfy the hardship dimension of 
punishment, they should be rejected as mitigating factors, for two key reasons. 
 
1 Injuries Sustained During the Offence Due to Offender Neglect Should 
Not Mitigate – Causation Lacking 
First, in relation to injuries that occur at the time of offending, there is 
insufficient nexus with the offence. Issues of causation are inherently complex 
and no satisfactory theory of legal causation has been developed by the courts or 
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legislature which can be invoked to provide clear answers to complex 
interactions.167 
However, several bright lines have been drawn in this context that apply to 
resolve clear-cut instances. They operate to exclude several forms of extra-curial 
punishment from being factored into the sentencing realm. 
Injuries sustained during the offence that fall into the first category set out 
above (ie, due to offender inadvertence or misadventure) are not sufficiently 
connected to the offending behaviour to be categorised as punishment. Rather, 
the fact that an offence is being committed in such circumstances is merely part 
of the backdrop to the injury. The injury is not precipitated by a finding of guilt 
nor an attribution of blame, at least not in the sense of a considered judgment 
being made to this end. Where an offender is injured in a drug laboratory 
explosion or in a motor vehicle collision that results in the death of other people, 
the injury is not caused by the fact that the conduct is a criminal offence. The 
legal characterisation of the behaviour is simply part of the contextual backdrop 
to the behaviour which can only be determined definitively in an ex-post facto 
sense. Moreover, there is clearly no institutional or systemic decision-making 
process that mandates criminality as being a necessary ingredient or requirement 
for the infliction of the injury. In such cases, the injury is simply an unfortunate 
happenstance arising from an (admittedly illegal) activity that the offender was 
undertaking at the time. The hardship (in the form of the injury) is not one that, in 
any sense of the word, is imposed for the crime. The connection between the 
crime and the injury is so tenuous that not even the most modest causation 
requirement is satisfied. The minimal test for causation that has been advanced is 
the ‘but for’ standard. If an accused person, who is suspected of dangerous 
driving, is injured during a collision that kills others and is subsequently 
acquitted of the offence, the injury will obviously remain even though any 
(institutional) sense of wrongdoing has been negated. It follows that the legality 
                                                 
167  The approaches include the ‘substantial and operating cause test’: R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141; R v PL 
(2009) 261 ALR 365; the ‘natural consequence standard/reasonable foresight test’: Royall v The Queen 
(1991) 172 CLR 378; and the ‘novus actus interveniens test’: R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411. None of the 
tests is paramount. As noted by McHugh J in Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378, 448: 
Judicial and academic efforts to achieve a coherent theory of common law causation have not met with 
significant success. Perhaps the nature of the subject matter when combined with the lawyer’s need to 
couple issues of factual causation with culpability make achievement of a coherent theory virtually 
impossible. 
  In the torts area the issue is just as opaque. Tests that have been adopted are the ‘but for’ test: C A L No 
14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis (2010) 240 
CLR 111; the ‘common sense’ test: March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506; and the 
‘scope of liability test’: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D. In sentencing, the approach is even more 
obscure. In some cases the courts have held that offenders are only liable for harm that was reasonably 
foreseeable as a result of the offender’s actions: Josefski v The Queen (2010) 217 A Crim R 183; 
however, on other occasions, broader approaches have been taken: Eade v The Queen (2012) 35 VR 526; 
DPP (Vic) v Marino [2011] VSCA 133, [30]–[31] (Kyrou AJA), with whom Buchanan and Nettle JJA 
agreed: at [1] (Buchanan JA), [2] (Nettle JA); DPP (Vic) v Eli [2008] VSCA 209, [36] (The Court) where 
a ‘natural result’ test was applied. See also Kenneth J Arenson, ‘Causation in the Criminal Law: A Search 
for Doctrinal Consistency’ (1996) 20 Criminal Law Journal 189. 
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of the conduct is merely part of the setting in which the injury occurred – but it is 
a setting that is of no legal relevance. 
 
2 Injuries Inflicted by Others Should not Mitigate: Appropriate Response is 
to Punish Them 
The mitigatory relevance of injuries sustained by offenders as a result of the 
infliction of harm by others (that is, categories (ii), (iii) and (iv) above), whether 
during the commission of the offence, vigilante attacks after the offence, or in the 
form of customary forms of punishment, could also potentially be dismissed 
using the same rationale. In relation to all of these instances, the hardship is 
invoked irrespective of whether the offender is guilty of the relevant offence. 
However, there is a logical difference between these injuries and those sustained 
as a result of the inattentiveness of the offender. In the case of the latter injuries, 
they are generally precipitated by a decision by another individual responding to 
an event that he or she (rightly or wrongly) believed to be a criminal offence. 
Thus, there is at least a tenable link between the injury and the crime. 
However, in determining the relevance of a mitigating consideration, it is 
necessary to understand the multidimensional institutional legal construct within 
which such factors operate. The sentencing system does not exist in a vacuum. It 
is subsumed within the broader system of criminal justice and the overarching 
system of law and justice. It is this wider perspective that negates the desirability 
of these forms of physical injury constituting a mitigating consideration. Legal 
coherence requires that individuals should not benefit from the lawful actions of 
others.168 In short, offenders who are injured as a result of, for example, defensive 
conduct by other individuals should not derive a benefit. Additionally, offenders 
who are injured as a result of the overreaction to their offending behaviour 
should also not benefit.  
The actions of individuals who respond unlawfully to the criminal conduct of 
offenders are criminal offences. The immediate and direct response to such 
actions should be to prosecute and sentence such individuals. Thus, in R v 
Hannigan, one of the reasons the Queensland Court of Appeal refused to reduce 
the sentence for an offender who was assaulted by an arresting police officer was 
because it was held that the appropriate response to the assault was to prosecute 
the police officer. Justice of Appeal Chesterman (with whom de Jersey CJ 
agreed) stated: 
To reduce the sentence imposed on the applicant will not work any sanction on the 
arresting constable. It will not operate as a punishment for his misconduct or as a 
deterrent against any future misconduct. If such sanctions are shown to be 
warranted they should be imposed by the means I have described. They will not be 
imposed by reducing the applicant’s sentence.169  
                                                 
168  As for the need for legal coherence across different legal subject areas, see CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor 
Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; Miller v Miller 
(2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
169  [2009] 2 Qd R 331, 337–8 [29]. 
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Admittedly, in some instances, prosecution of the individual who caused the 
offender’s injuries is not feasible; for example, in the case of an assault victim 
who injures the accused while acting in self-defence. In these cases, there is 
nevertheless no basis for mitigating the sentence of the offender. The victim’s 
response is a situational (and often) instinctive response, which generally has no 
connection to the criminality of the act. Put simply, the appropriateness of the 
victim’s response is not defined by the criminality or otherwise of the offender’s 
conduct. For example, a victim is permitted to act in self-defence against an 
insane attacker in the same manner as against a sane aggressor. Thus, the 
criminality or otherwise of the conduct of the offender is merely part of the 
backdrop to the injury – as is the case of the scenarios set out in category (i). The 
injury to the offender is not punishment in any sense of the word. 
The second reason that all injuries sustained by an offender which have a 
supposed connection to the offending should not mitigate is that the impact of an 
injury is not contingent upon the circumstance in which it was sustained. A one-
legged prisoner feels the same additional burden whether he lost his leg during a 
burglary or as a result of a workplace injury. 
 
3 Injuries Inflicted by Others Should not Mitigate: Additional Burden of 
Sanction on Infirm Offenders is Already Mitigating 
Thirdly, injuries sustained during the commission of an offence or shortly 
afterwards should not mitigate because a discount is often already accorded 
where an offender finds a sanction more burdensome because of his or her 
physical (or mental) state. The courts have generally been prepared to confer a 
discount where ill health or infirmity make prison more difficult. In R v Smith,170 
King CJ stated: 
Generally speaking ill health will be a factor tending to mitigate punishment only 
when it appears that imprisonment will be a greater burden on the offender by 
reason of his state of health or when there is a serious risk of imprisonment having 
a gravely adverse effect on the offender’s health.171 
There are numerous instances where bad health has been mitigating.172 In R v 
Puc, the mental frailty of the offender was mitigatory. The Court stated: 
                                                 
170  (1987) 44 SASR 587. 
171  Ibid 589. See also R v Vachalec [1981] 1 NSWLR 351, 353 (The Court). Ill health can affect the total 
effective sentence and the length of the non-parole period: R v Magner [2004] VSCA 202. Old age is also 
generally regarded as a mitigating factor: Gulyas v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 539. 
However, it is often given little weight: see Ljuboja v The Queen (2011) 210 A Crim R 274; R v Cave 
[2012] SASCFC 42. While old age and adverse health are often coupled together as mitigating 
considerations, the reasons for additional burden are different. In the case of old age, it is because ‘each 
year of a sentence represents a substantial proportion of the period of life which is left to an offender of 
advanced age’: Ljuboja v The Queen (2011) 210 A Crim R 274, 295 [102] (Buss JA). 
172  See, eg, Eliasen v The Queen (1991) 53 A Crim R 391, 396 (Crockett J), where AIDS was mitigating. 
Both McGarvie and Phillips JJ agreed with Justice Crockett’s judgment: at 397. See also R v Magner 
[2004] VSCA 202; A W P v The Queen [2012] VSCA 41; R v Van Boxtel (2005) 11 VR 258, 267 
(Callaway JA), with whom Ormiston and Charles JJA agreed: at 259 [1] (Ormiston JA), 259 [2] (Charles 
JA). 
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Impaired mental functioning will also be relevant to sentencing where the 
existence of the condition at the date of sentencing means that the sentence will 
weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person in normal health, or 
where there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect 
on the offender’s mental health.173 
This principle is reinforced by the reality that medical treatment in prison is 
invariably of a lesser standard than in the community, due to difficulties in 
transporting prisoners to medical facilities and delays in seeing specialists.174 To 
allow a further reduction where the injury occurred in the course of a crime is to 
double-dip for this factor. 
 
4 Injuries Suffered by an Offender do not Reduce the Need for Specific 
Deterrence 
Moreover, to the extent that the courts have provided express reasons for 
sometimes mitigating penalty on account of injuries sustained by an offender, 
these rationales are flawed. As we saw above, three such reasons have been 
advanced. The first rationale suggested by the courts is that an offender who 
sustains injuries at or about the time of offending will thereby be deterred from 
future offending. In sentencing terms, the courts here are referring to specific 
deterrence. However, as we have seen above, there is no evidence that this 
objective is achievable.175 The second rationale is connected to the first. It is the 
view that injuries associated with offending will provide the offender with an 
‘unhappy reminder’ of the crime. 176  This is, in effect, merely a speculative 
observation as opposed to a reason for reducing a sentence. 
 
5 Injuries Suffered by an Offender do not Reduce the Need for Retribution 
The third rationale is that the need for retribution is diminished as a result  
of the harm suffered by the offender. It is difficult to address this rationale  






                                                 
173  [2008] VSCA 159, [32] (Maxwell P). Both Nettle and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreed with President 
Maxwell’s judgment: at [35] (Nettle JA), [36] (Dodds-Streeton JA). 
174  Pfeiffer v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 145, [14] (McClellan CJ at CL), with whom Simpson and Buddin 
JJ agreed: at [28] (Simpson J), [29] (Buddin J). But there is no firm principle that ill health must reduce 
jail length. Thus, in R v Wickham [2004] NSWCCA 193, [18] (Howie J), with whom Bell and Hislop JJ 
agreed: at [1] (Bell J), [52] (Hislop J), it was held that: 
Common humanity will sometimes require a court to consider a life-threatening physical illness as a 
matter of mitigation even though the offender was suffering from such an illness at the time of the 
commission of the offence. However, where as here, the issue is one of the protection of the community, 
it may be that common humanity for the offender gives way to concern for potential victims. 
175  See above Part III. 
176  See above n 25. 
2016 The Irrelevance to Sentencing of (Most) Incidental Hardships 79 
While retribution is a well-developed concept in the literature involving the 
justification of punishment,177 its meaning has not been discussed at length by the 
judiciary.178 
Justice McHugh, in Ryan v The Queen, 179  provided the most expansive 
statement regarding the nature of retribution in sentencing. His Honour stated 
that the aim of retribution is to maintain public confidence in the courts. His 
Honour also added: 
Thus, the existing principles require many sentences to be retributive in nature, a 
notion that reflects the community’s expectation that the offender will suffer 
punishment and that particular offences will merit severe punishment. The 
‘persistently punitive’ attitude of the community towards criminals means that 
public confidence in the courts to do justice would be likely to be lost if courts 
ignored the retributive aspect of punishment. In the middle of the twentieth 
century, the need for sentences that were conducive to the rehabilitation of the 
prisoner was much emphasised. Less attention was then paid to the retributive 
aspect which was often ignored by an embarrassing silence. But under the notion 
of giving the offender his or her ‘just deserts’, the retributive aspect has re-
asserted itself in recent years.180 
Thus, retribution has two aspects. It is advanced as a stand-alone justification 
for punishing offenders as well as a limiting principle, confining punishment to a 
level that is commensurate with the gravity of the crime.181 Interpreted in the 
second manner, as we have seen, it has a statutory foundation in most 
jurisdictions.182 
On either understanding of the retributive ideal, the central tenet of the notion 
is that the punishment should fit the crime, which is an embodiment of the 
                                                 
177  See discussion in Part III above. 
178  When it is mentioned by sentencing courts, it is generally merely declared as being relevant without any 
explanation of the concept: see, eg, R v CBG [2013] QCA 44, [30] (Atkinson J), with whom White and 
Gotterson JJA agreed: at [4] (White JA), [5] (Gotterson JA); R v Tout [2012] QCA 296, [19] (Fraser JA), 
with whom Muir and Gotterson JJA agreed: at [1] (Muir JA), [23] (Gotterson JA); R v Roberts-O’Keefe 
[2012] QCA 260, [39] (McMeekin J), with whom Holmes and Gotterson JJA agreed: at [1] (Holmes JA), 
[2] (Gotterson JA); Buksh v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 60; Hudd v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 57; 
Phan v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 49; Azzopardi v The Queen (2011) 35 VR 43; R v Pickard [2011] 
SASCFC 134, [92] (Blue J); DPP (Tas) v T [2012] TASCCA 15, [23] (Crawford CJ), with whom Evans 
and Tennent JJ agreed: at [25] (Evans J), [26] (Tennent J); Crosswell v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 1, 
[19] (Evans J); Brough v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 110, [18] (Barr JA), with whom Latham and 
Button JJ agreed: at [1] (Latham J), [2] (Button J); Thompson-Davis v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 75, 
[77] (Campbell J), with whom Beazley P and Hall J agreed: at [1] (Beazley P), [2] (Hall J); DPP (Vic) v 
Anderson [2013] VSCA 45, [1] (The Court); Collins v The Queen [2012] VSCA 163, [73] (Hansen JA). 
179  (2001) 206 CLR 267. 
180  Ibid 282–3 [46] (citations omitted).  
181  Lawbook, The Laws of Australia (at 14 November 2014) 12 Criminal Sentencing ‘1 Purposes of 
Sentencing’ [12.1.60]; Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Sentencing Manual (at 10 April 2015) B 
General Sentencing Principles ‘7 Sentencing Purposes’ [7.2.2] 
<http://www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/eManuals/VSM/index.htm#15303.htm>. 
182  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(k); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7(1)(a); Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A(a); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1)(a); Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(a); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(j); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
s 5(1)(a); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(1). 
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proportionality principle. 183  However, as we have seen, this cannot justify 
allowing injuries to the offender to mitigate, irrespective of the circumstances in 
which the injuries were sustained or their exact timing. 
 
6 Analogy between Offender Injuries and Remorse Is Not Persuasive 
The last possible basis for attempting to find a role for injuries sustained 
during the offending to mitigate penalty, is by drawing an analogy with a well-
accepted mitigating consideration in the form of remorse. Physical harm 
stemming from an offence is, arguably, in principle no different from mental 
harm or anguish that is experienced by an offender. Remorse is a well-
established mitigating factor.184 This is a self-induced feeling of regret relating to 
the crime.185 The presence of remorse can operate to significantly reduce the 
severity of the punishment meted out to an accused, as was explained in Neal v 
The Queen: ‘Contrition, repentance and remorse after the offence are mitigating 
factors, leading in a proper case to some, perhaps considerable, reduction of the 
normal sentence’.186 
While remorse is not a recognisable mental condition, it is a negative mental 
affliction which sets back the sentiments of an offender. It is, therefore, 
potentially a form of incidental punishment: remorseful offenders hurt more than 
identically placed non-remorseful offenders. 
The main rationale for ascribing weight to remorse in the sentencing calculus 
is the assumption that repentant offenders accept that their behaviour was wrong 
and are, presumably, less likely to reoffend.187 
However, this same rationale cannot be applied to injuries sustained by the 
offender during or at about the time of the offence. There is no evidence or even 
strong theoretical basis (as opposed to mere conjecture) for assuming that an 
offender who is injured during the commission of an offence is less likely to 
reoffend.188 
Thus, it emerges that the existing orthodoxy that inclines to the practice of 
according mitigation to offenders who are injured during or at about the time of 
the commission of an offence, is flawed. In most cases, the crime is simply the 
                                                 
183  Anderson, above n 112; von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes, above n 112, ch 1; Ryberg, above n 112, 2. 
184  R v Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442, 452 (King CJ); R v Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, 412 [118] 
(Spigelman CJ); Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339; Davy v The Queen [2011] VSCA 98. 
185  In Fusimalohi v The Queen [2012] ACTCA 49, [31], Refshauge J made the following observations 
regarding the meaning of remorse: 
R Edney and M Bagaric, in Australian Sentencing: Principles and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 175, describe remorse as ‘the feeling of regret or sorrow for what one has done.’ See also 
[Alvares v The Queen (2011) 209 A Crim R 297] at 313; [44], and at 311; [38] where Buddin J noted that 
there is a relevant distinction between ‘contrition’ and ‘remorse’. It is, as Winneke P noted in R v Whyte 
(2004) 7 VR 397 at 403; [21] ‘not to be confused with such emotions as self-pity.’ Nor, as Asche CJ noted 
in R v Jabaltjari (1989) 64 NTR 1 at 10, should it be confused with a different emotion of ‘being ... sorry 
for being caught’. As Winneke P said, ‘it is an elusive concept’. 
186  (1982) 149 CLR 305, 315 (Murphy J). 
187  See Mackenzie and Stobbs, above n 8, 93. 
188  Unless the nature of the injury makes it difficult for them to, eg, carry out future robberies. We thank the 
anonymous referee for this clarification. 
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backdrop in which the injury occurred – it is not sufficiently causally connected 
to the offending to constitute punishment, hence, it is irrelevant to the hardship 
limb of the proportionality thesis. In circumstances where the injury occurs 
because of the offending, it is still unsound to reduce the penalty because the 
extra burden that may be felt by the offender as a result of the injury is already a 
discrete mitigating factor. Wider principles of justice also militate against a 
penalty concession in these circumstances. 
 
C   Employment Deprivations Should Reduce Penalty 
As noted above, a number of employment-related hardships are experienced 
by some offenders as a result of being convicted of a criminal offence. They 
include being dismissed from a job, being precluded from pursuing a certain 
career, such as law or accountancy, or having those prospects severely curtailed 
as a result of a conviction. There is little doubt these deprivations set back  
the interests of offenders: ‘a person’s employment is usually one of the  
most important things in his or her life. It gives not only a livelihood but  
an occupation, an identity and a sense of self-esteem’. 189  It is clear that an 
unemployed offender who commits a fraud suffers less than a lawyer who loses 
his or her practising certificate as a result of the same offence, and who receives 
the same court sanction. Thus, a tenable argument is that the effect the 
commission of a crime has on an offender’s employment situation should be 
recognised in the sentencing calculus. 
Further, unlike the other instances of extra-curial punishment which have 
been analysed above, there is a direct connection between the crime and the 
diminished employment situation of the offender. The hardship stems from a 
systemic and lawful process which is normally implemented by the employer (or 
registration board) and which directly stems from the finding of guilt for a 
criminal offence. The causal nexus between the crime and hardship is evident. 
As noted in Part IV(B)(2) above, sentencing law does not exist in a vacuum 
and is not necessarily superior to other branches of law. It should take into 
account wider issues of public and social policy. To this end, as noted above, it 
has been argued that sentencing law should not operate to perpetuate existing 
undesirable social or economic structures. It has been suggested that an 
employment deprivation discount is inappropriate because it would discriminate 
between offenders and exacerbate existing unfair social structure by, again, 
favouring those privileged to hold a job. To allow employment status to result in 
a sentencing discount, so the argument runs, only further compounds the 
disadvantage that is experienced by the unemployed offender. 
This argument fails. The fact that one individual has an occupation and 
another does not, is not of itself indicative of an unfair economic or social 
situational advantage. Australia is a market economy and largely a meritocracy. 
Differences in job status are just as likely to indicate a contrast in commitment 
and application towards the acquisition of the education and skill sets necessary 
                                                 
189  Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518, 539 [35] (Lord Hoffmann). 
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to gain employment, as to indicate the unfair treatment of the unemployed 
individuals. 
Employment deprivations are a form of punishment. Consequently, they 
should be recognised in the overall sanction meted out to an offender, and be 
subject to the normal sentencing practices and principles governing the infliction 
of criminal punishment. 
To be clear, what should mitigate is not only the loss of a job as a result of a 
criminal sanction but also any employment deprivation. This extends to the 
diminished capacity of an offender to secure employment and the disqualification 
or suspension of a professional or similar qualification (as in the areas of  
law, medicine or accounting) that often stems from a criminal sanction. 
Moreover, the mitigatory impact of employment deprivation should apply, even 
where the offence occurred in the employment setting. There is an intuitive 
distinction between a solicitor who loses his or her practising certificate as a 
result of stealing trust money, and one who has it cancelled because of 
committing a burglary.190 However, intuition aside, there is no principled basis 
for the distinction. There is no evidence to suggest that offenders who commit 
crime in the context of their work setting are more likely to reoffend than those 
who commit crime in another setting. 
A difficulty associated with accommodating employment deprivations in the 
sentencing calculus is that, at the time of sentence, the impact of the conviction 
on employment status will not be certain. However, that should not prevent 
mitigation being accorded. Sentencing courts are accustomed to making informed 
assessments of future events, and giving appropriate weight to them in the 
decision regarding an appropriate penalty. Thus, sentencing judges must often 
make predictions of the likely impact of imprisonment on an offender, their 
prospects of reoffending, and the like. A similar methodology and reasoning 
should apply in the context of anticipating the employment hardships that are 
likely to follow from being found guilty of the offence in question. 
Deportation should also be a mitigating consideration, for similar reasons as 
employment deprivations. Deportation for a crime is causally related to offending 
behaviour because it is contingent upon a finding of guilt and imposed in a 
systemic and deliberative manner as a direct response to the criminal activity. As 
noted earlier, some cases have indicated that deportation should only mitigate 
penalty if it can be established that it would cause hardship to the offender. It is 
appropriate to maintain this requirement. However, it is not a requirement  
that most offenders would find difficult to establish.191 Individuals who are in 
Australia have made a considered decision to come to this country, typically 
because they believe it is the place where they can flourish most fully. Most 
offenders have familial or other connections in Australia and some will have 
                                                 
190  The distinction was invoked in R v Talia [2009] VSCA 260, [28] (The Court): see above n 81 and 
accompanying text. 
191  Especially given that mitigating factors need only be established on the balance of probabilities: R v 
Storey [1998] 1 VR 359, 369 (Winneke P, Brooking and Hayne JJA and Southwell AJA); R v Olbrich 
(1999) 199 CLR 270, 281 [27] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
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business and employment interests. Being forced to sever the connections 
invariably causes some degree of hardship to offenders. The only offenders who 
could discharge this burden are likely to be those who have been in Australia for 
a very short period. 
 
V   CONCLUSION 
Incidental forms of punishment relating to criminal offending come in a 
variety of different forms. No clear jurisprudence has emerged regarding the 
circumstances in which these forms of harms should mitigate penalty. The 
general trend of authorities is that physical harm sustained during the course of 
an offence should reduce penalty, and to a lesser extent, so too should 
employment deprivations, public opprobrium and deportation. It is important to 
emphasise that there are many exceptions to each of these approaches. 
This area of law is likely to remain unstable and uncertain in the foreseeable 
future. This is to some extent a reflection of the imprecise nature of sentencing 
law. However, the main reason for the obscurity and lack of clarity in this area of 
the law is the cursory jurisprudential treatment of this issue by the courts. In 
(generally) allowing extra-curial harm to mitigate penalty, the courts invoke 
broad, unproven or dubious principles (such as deterrence, retribution and the 
rehabilitation of offenders), and make speculative assertions regarding the 
relevance of potential mitigating factors to these objectives. 
The confused nature of this area of law ultimately derives from the lack of 
doctrinal clarity regarding the place of extra-curial harms in the system of 
sentencing overall. This article attempts to address this gap in the research and in 
the legal reasoning. 
Extra-curial harms should only be factored into the sentencing calculus if 
they are relevant to the proportionality principle and, in particular, if they 
increase the hardship experienced by the offender. In order for this to occur, the 
incidental harms need to constitute a form of punishment, which requires a causal 
nexus to the offending behaviour. 
Public opprobrium fails this standard because it is not a measurable harm and 
is a hardship which can be ignored by a resilient offender; it is not a form of 
punishment. Harm sustained while offending is not sufficiently causally related 
to the offending to constitute punishment. Moreover, if, as a result of a physical 
harm sustained during or around the time of the offence, the offender sustains an 
additional burden as part of the criminal sanction (especially imprisonment), the 
offender will receive a reduced penalty on account of this consideration. It is only 
employment deprivations and deportation that should be factored into the 
sentencing calculus. They are directly related to the criminal act and stem from a 
deliberate and systematic approach to the crime. 
The above approach to extra-curial hardships in the sentencing calculus will 
explain and justify the impact these common forms of deprivation should have in 
the sentencing calculus and will assist to inject greater clarity into a complex area 
of sentencing law. 
